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Tennessee House Public Safety Committee Hearing: March 23, 2010

CSDL, Tue, 02/23/2010 - 04:00

Max Bluestein, Coordinator of Research, Coalition for a Secure Driver’s License
Hello. My name is Max Bluestein and I am the Coordinator of Research for the Coalition for a Secure Driver’s License (CSDL).
We are a non-partisan 501 (c)(3), crime prevention, educational public charity incorporated in Washington, D.C. We have approximately 6,500 member donors from throughout the United States, and receive no corporate funding.
The central mission of the Coalition for a Secure Driver’s License is to improve the security of state driver’s licenses, and other identity documents issued by state and federal government agencies.  We take no position with regard to broad immigration issues. We strongly support enforcement of federal and state laws addressing the criminality of document and identity fraud.
Our testimony today is with regard to HB 1426.
We urge this Committee to carefully consider the consequences of the Tennessee legislature barring the state government from voluntary compliance with Public Law 109-13 regulations, also known as the REAL ID Act (Title II) regulations.
Please take note that the REAL ID Act contains other titles in addition to driver’s License regulations. The identity document requirements of interest to your committee are contained only in Title II of the REAL ID Act. 
Unless this Committee has an interest in Tennessee’s government opposing the construction of the border security fence along the Mexican border, the deportation of legal immigrants charged with providing material support to terrorists, or any of the other provisions not pertaining to driver’s licenses, HB 1426 should be amended to strictly address the subject which its sponsors claim to address.
However, I will address HB 1426 as though it were written to only address the regulatory requirements of Title II of Public Law 109-13.
It is very likely that most states will quietly comply with the federal standards over the next two to five years even though compliance with the regulations is voluntary.
In the event that the PASS ID Act, now pending consideration in the U.S. Senate, becomes a replacement set of federal standards, only a few of the current regulatory requirements will be removed.
Further, PASS ID has a number of new and different requirements for the states, should it pass both the U.S. Senate and U.S. House in its current form. And the deadlines of the PASS ID Act are not significantly different than those of Title II of the REAL ID Act. Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee is a co-sponsor of the PASS ID Act.
I have a map presentation prepared by the Coalition that shows the current disposition of state compliance with the 18 Interim Benchmarks of Public Law 109-13, also known as the REAL ID Act federal regulations. Would you please look at the color coded map with me? Note the states marked as green with gold stars. You will see that ten states have met all 18 benchmarks, notably the adjacent state of Kentucky.
I have also provided a summary of where Tennessee stands on compliance with those benchmarks based exclusively on my organization’s research of your state’s published procedures and rules. I believe Tennessee lacks only four of the 18 Interim Benchmarks.
One of the four requirements which Tennessee has not met is specifically aimed at preventing imposter document fraud.
One is aimed at making driver’s licenses more counterfeit resistant. The other two pertain to recognition of Tennessee licenses as compliant.
In detail, these are:
Requirement 1 – subject each applicant to a facial image capture and retain the image even if a driver’s license or ID card is not issued. How does this prevent fraud? Compliant states can use digital photo matching software to identify individuals who hold multiple cards in multiple names and addresses. Compliant states can also pull up digital images on their license issuance systems when a renewal card is requested, to prevent an imposter from obtaining another person’s license as a renewal, but with a new facial image of the imposter.
Requirement 9: Issue driver’s licenses and ID cards with level 1, 2, and 3 integrated security features. Other states are moving to integrated, hidden security attributes because of the large scale counterfeiting that occurs in the United States to meet demand from a variety of customers.  Meeting this requirement would likely cost Tennessee less than $2 per card issued, based on the costs of other states who have upgraded their cards to meet the requirement.
Tennessee should meet this requirement because of public safety aspects. Please consider who benefits from the current ease of counterfeiting driver’s licenses in states like Tennessee.
Based on the Coalition’s research, the largest two customer groups for counterfeit driver’s licenses and ID cards are (a) underage residents who want to purchase alcoholic beverages and/or tobacco products, and (b) people who are ineligible to obtain valid driver’s licenses because of previous driving violations or because they do not meet states lawful presence requirements, which includes illegal aliens.
Research suggests that the next largest group of customers for counterfeit driver’s licenses is comprised of professional criminals, including professional identity thieves.
Based on a study of identity fraud cases completed in 2009 by a department of Utica College, New York, counterfeit or fraudulently obtained driver’s license were a component of one in three identity fraud cases studied.
Others who employ driver’s licenses to conceal their real identities for criminal purposes include drug distribution gangs, methamphetamine cook operations, and, of course, human trafficking rings.
Requirements 11 and 18 of the Interim Benchmarks pertain to the perceived future benefit of expedited travel at airports for Tennessee residents boarding airplanes, once the compliance dates come into force. Forcing Tennessee residents to stand in the “slow line” at airports in future years by enacting HB 1426 is likely to have unintended consequences for the legislature in those same future years.
Since 1913 when New Jersey issued the first driver’s license, their use has moved beyond simply demonstrating that a person is eligible to drive. State and federal laws have expanded the value of the driver’s license to include a whole host of identification purposes. Today, it is the preferred identification document for business and for law enforcement.  The driver’s license is the ID card relied upon by federal agencies confirming the identities of applicants for U.S. Passports, replacement Social Security Cards, or for people about to board domestic airliners.
In fact, we use our driver’s license as an ID card many times a year, and use it as evidence to drive only when renting a car or for that occasional police traffic stop. And it is because it is accepted so readily as proof of identity at the grocery store, at the bank, at the liquor store, that foreign visitors seek to obtain it.  
It would be nice, and probably politically correct, to believe foreign visitors who overstay their visas are all wonderful people. But that would only be wishful thinking.
This was a lesson learned by the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Eighteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers carried some form of government-issued identification, mostly state driver’s licenses, many of which were obtained through identity fraud.
The licenses and state issued ID cards the terrorists carried were all full term, good for six years or more, despite the short term visas issued to them. Several of the visas carried by the terrorists had already expired, and the rest would have expired in the same month they died while bombing the twin towers and the Pentagon, or crashing into a farmer’s field in Pennsylvania.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly referred to as the “9/11 Commission”), stated that,
“Secure identification should begin in the United States. The federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers’ licenses. Fraud in identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists .”
Since the PASS ID Act was introduced in July, 2009, there have been several incidents on U.S. soil that involve individuals attempting to commit terrorist acts. On September 24, 2009, a nineteen year old Palestinian national named Hosam Smadi was arrested by the FBI and charged with planning to bomb a 60 story glass office tower in Dallas, Texas.
 On November 13, 2009 U.S. citizen, Major Nidal Hasan shot and killed 13 other Americans at Fort Hood, Texas, apparently under the influence of an imam named Anwar al-Aulaqi. 
On Christmas Day, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb on Norwest Flight 253 about to land at Detroit. On February 5, 2010, Abdulmutallab told the FBI that he was directed to blow up a plan by the same imam, Anwar al-Aulaqi, who influenced Major Nidal Hasan via email.  
On February 22, 2010, Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty for his role in a “martyrdom operation” plot to detonate potent explosives in New York’s subway system.
It is of paramount importance to the public safety and the national security of the United States that a driver’s license accurately conveys the identity of the individual presenting it.
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